>Like what? The halting problem is (I think?) the standard example. Here's a short video on it ▶ this video
in “DeepMind says reinforcement learning is ‘enough’ to reach general AI” · View on HN
Turing & The Halting Problem - Computerphile on HackerTube: recommended by 2 Hacker News commenters across 2 separate months, 2019–2022.
explainer · intro · evergreen
A Computerphile video in which Mark Jago of the University of Nottingham explains Turing's halting problem and how it led to the blueprint for the modern computer.
Offered as a short, clear explanation of the halting problem and its link to decidability.
“Here's a short video on it”
4 Hacker News comments link this video. Each one links back to its thread.
>Like what? The halting problem is (I think?) the standard example. Here's a short video on it ▶ this video
in “DeepMind says reinforcement learning is ‘enough’ to reach general AI” · View on HN
For one practical example, Gödel's incompleteness is directly related to decidability problems in CS. there's this glorious liar paradox machine discussed by Computerphile [0]. [0] ▶ this video
in “Kurt Gödel and the Mechanization of Mathematics” · View on HN
no, it's all in software because you can create any smart contract and it can call any other. There is a difference in knowing after the transaction has finalized and predicting beforehand, which is when you would want to block the transaction. ▶ this video
in “Tornado Cash and collateral damage” · View on HN
In my view, this isn't really a software problem. Your plan is on the right track though. We already know its neigh impossible to ensure software is bug and vuln free. We have to reckon with the fact that secure software is possible, but extremely hard and impractical to achieve with any regularity. Because of well known computer science problems such as the Halting Problem[0] and more that I am totally ignorant of, the only alternative is extremely thorough verification like happens in planes[1]. The rub is that unlike aerospace and other critical controls, we cannot define the software security problem as closely as is possible in those other critical systems. Doing so will undo the benefits of our general technology solutions. The reason I claim it is nonetheless not a software problem is: In case after case of these troubling examples of security failures, there are only a few organizational commonalities that link them all together. Time after time, there are shocking misconfigurations, corners cut, best practices eschewed, warnings ignored, processes disregarded or absent and swept under the rug. C-Suite execs, as has been well noted, opt for the checkbox-style silver-bullet-whiz-bang, because they can understand the value proposition of one-problem-one-fix and it is easy to communicate to stakeholders. They are totally ignorant to and uninterested in the details of actually providing a quality product. Their product is often not what they are selling; They are getting
in “Up to 1,500 businesses affected by ransomware attack, Kaseya CEO says” · View on HN