DEFCON 19: Bit-squatting: DNS Hijacking Without Exploitation (w speaker)

On the post, if Linus is referring to low-end Xeon and workstation non-Xeon lacking ECC, I think it's completely idiotic. Nearly all infrastructure should be baking in ECC as standard rather than some "option" to not have silent, unknowable, probabilistic corruption that is realistically realizable on a near-daily basis given the orders of magnitude of network, storage and computational volumes of today (and the future) by ever lower tiers of end-users and common examples of network infrastructure. DEFCON 19: Bit-squatting: DNS Hijacking Without Exploitation (w speaker) ▶ this video

in “EPYC SAP-SD 2-tier benchmark results” · View on HN

Depends on how you encrypt over HTTP. You can achieve similar benefits of verification with PGP and similarly rich object level encryption. Be careful of gotchas in how PGP or similar work, if you choose it (notable what is or isn't plaintext). Object level encryption typically allows for better separation of concerns as it does not bottleneck to a unique domain:port to seperate encryption contexts. It also eases separation of public facing encryption risks from private internal ones. If a public server is breached, all HTTPS traffic can be read, but if it proxies a more secure, perhaps simpler application environment (perhaps a microservice for the specific functionality), then that application environment is not affected by vulnerabilities in unrelated public facing features (like a backup microservice might not care about how to render HTML/JavaScript, so wouldn't be vulnerable to common web XSS attacks). It allows other benefits like: - it faciliates only user can decrypt data being sent (good for backups) - intermediate services to load balance and block DOS don't have to be exposed to the plaintext data, only the necessary service that needs it - many to many encrypted messages over one connection (TLS is many to 1 decrypting endpoints) - intermediate caching and redelivery of messages can be done with ease - it likely is harder to be at risk of bitflips ( ▶ this video ) - similarly verification of the data with signatures reduces risk of data corruption being missed that ma

in “Ask HN: Difference between HTTPS vs. encrypting at the application layer?” · View on HN

Google is quite famous for running their data centers hotter than others. * Title makes it obvious, but 95f : [link] * Increased in dns request failures(likely due to said heat) and bad routing cause internal iGoogle services to request this guy's stuff: ▶ this video

in “SSD reliability in the real world: Google's experience” · View on HN

> ▶ this video Interesting talk. I did find that <takes a drink> later in his talk he kept <takes a drink> taking a drink every 10 seconds or so <takes a drink> , which ended up being more than a <takes a drink> little <takes a drink> irritating to watch and listen <takes a drink> to.

in “SSD reliability in the real world: Google's experience” · View on HN