The Memory Sinkhole - Unleashing An X86 Design Flaw Allowing Universal Privilege Escalation on HackerTube: recommended by 1 Hacker News commenter across 1 month, 2017–2022.
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Christopher Domas's Black Hat 2015 talk on a long-unnoticed x86 design flaw that lets an attacker reach System Management Mode, a ring below the OS. It explains how the legacy architecture allows universal privilege escalation and persistent, hard-to-detect malware.
Cited in discussions of CPU hidden features, Intel's security failures and SMM malware as a concrete example of a forgotten processor feature being exploited.
“There was a blackhat talk on embedding malware in SMM and triggering it with a magic number written to a register”
6 Hacker News comments link this video. Each one links back to its thread.
This is a thing and was used in this fantastic piece: ▶ this video However the way they obtained these dumps is by going deep into debugger mode of the cpu which makes me doubt anything spooky would be going on.
in “Intel Microcode Decryptor” · View on HN
I can make an argument that money will make it even worse, as people will full-time make even more useless features that just increase the attack surface. This particular class of problems (same as the sqlite fts tokenizer exploit and most of openssl exploits, even lots of the sendmail exploits) are just obscure unused features. It happens even in CPUs themselves. (e.g. ▶ this video ) Removing code is twice harder than adding code, why do you think paid maintainers would improve anything? Just look at the code written in FAANG or any enterprise, and those maintainers are very well paid, imagine this code being public, we will have 1 new exploit per day per company... and that is assuming non malicious developers that can be shipping trojan code [link] (it is also hard to assume all millions of developers are non malicious, even if we assume 1 in 100000, things look really bad) Less code is the one solution. Regardless if open source or enterprise code. We are stuck, and change is needed, but money is not a solution, and might even be the cause of the problem. (incentive to write more code)
in “Professional maintainers: a wake-up call” · View on HN
I can imagine some ways to armor the branch predictor, similar in principle to how languages like Perl have to include a random seed in their hash code (in some circumstances) to avoid being able to pre-compute values that will all hash to the same thing [1]. There should be some ways to relatively cheaply periodically inject such a randomization into the prediction system enough to prevent that aspect of the attack. This will cost something but probably not be noticeable to even the most performance-sensitive consumers. But no solution leaps to mind for the problem of preventing speculative code from leaking things via cache, short of entirely preventing speculating code from being able to load things into the cache. If nobody can come up with a solution for that, that's going to cost us something to close that side channel. Not sure what though, without a really thorough profiling run. And I'd put my metaphorical $5 down on someone finding another side channel from the speculative code; interactions with changing processor flags in a speculative execution, or interaction with some forgotten feature [2] where the speculation ends up incorrectly undone or something. Yuck. [1]: [link] [2]: ▶ this video - The Memory Sinkhole - Unleashing An X86 Design Flaw Allowing Universal Privilege Escalation (Dec 29, 2015)
in “Reading privileged memory with a side-channel” · View on HN
> adding the possibility to turn it off should suffice. How could Intel/AMD reasonably communicate this to customers and have it taken at face value? "Here's a flag to disable this black box we ship in every CPU. The product design and source code are proprietary, so please take our word for it that this flag disables everything." There was a blackhat talk on embedding malware in SMM and triggering it with a magic number written to a register to escalate the process privileges. [0] So there will always be suspicion of special triggers to re-enable the black box that you turned "off" I think there is a very slim chance that Intel and AMD can regain credibility when it concerns the IME/PSP. Especially after it emerged Intel created a special ME disabled mode intended for US agency customers. [1] [0] ▶ this video [1] [link]
in “MINIX – The most popular OS in the world, thanks to Intel” · View on HN
Chris Domas works at Battelle Memorial Institute. Battelle is a "non profit R&D house" that just so happens to hire "retiring" CIA operatives, and work on tons of CIA/NSA contracts. Completely coincidentally Chris Domas managed to discover the only Intel CPU backdoor ever discovered and publicized the very same year Intel already patched it ▶ this video
in “Two Hidden Instructions Discovered in Intel CPUs Enable Microcode Modification” · View on HN
Then from recent Defcon and Black Hat talks, they are an absymal failure. ( ▶ this video Memory Sinkhole - Unleashing An X86 Design Flaw Allowing Universal Privilege Escalation ) (I don't understand it beyond what everyone says it can achieve) Intel should be considered to be totally unreliable and incompetent. I mean, no one buys office store safes and expects their things to be secure in them. But a processor is a little more expensive than a cheap safe and holds more valuable things. Edit: and besides, Fortezza is an SSL protocol option.
in “Qubes OS: A reasonably secure operating system” · View on HN